Anti-Assad Syrians lead protests against prison torture by rebel group

 

 'Despite the dangers of dissent, people in northwestern Syria have been taking to the streets in recent weeks to protest an armed group formed out of an al-Qaeda breakaway faction.

 The protests against Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which controls a large portion of Idlib province, began on February 25 in Sarmada, near the Syria-Turkey border.

 Prompted by the treatment of prisoners by the group’s security arm, the General Security Service (GSS), protesters carry banners calling HTS prisons “slaughterhouses”. Protests with hundreds of participants have now taken place across Idlib.

 In Binnish, 29-year-old Mohammed Ali Basha spent the night before an anti-HTS protest last week preparing flags and banners with his friends.

 The activist painted three red stars on the green, white and black backdrop of the Syrian opposition’s flag. A large banner being prepared displays the message Basha and his fellow protesters want to put across: that the Syrian revolution – which began in 2011 – is not just against the country’s President Bashar al-Assad, but against all “tyrants”.

 “All of them means all of them,” it says, a slogan long adopted by members of the Syrian opposition to indicate their opposition to autocrats of all persuasions. And for Basha, that includes HTS and its leader, Abu Mohamad al-Jolani.

 “Our protests against HTS resemble our early demonstrations against Bashar al-Assad and his régime because in both cases we have taken to the streets to denounce injustice and preserve our dignity and freedom,” Basha said. “Over the past few years, I have noticed the injustice practised against the people of the liberated areas [not controlled by al-Assad], and how the security branches affiliated with HTS have begun to commit the same criminal acts committed by al-Assad’s security forces, such as killing under torture and arbitrary detention.”



 Ahmad Alhakim said he knows all too well what can happen in an HTS prison. His brother, Abdulqadir, was tortured to death in one, he said.

 Abdulqadir, 27, a father of three and a fighter in the Jaish al-Ahrar opposition group, was arrested by HTS last year on charges of dealing with foreign powers.

 “They abducted my brother for 10 months without us being able to know his whereabouts, any information about him, or even appoint a lawyer to pursue his case,” Alhakim said.

 In mid-February, Alhakim was told by a released detainee that Abdulqadir had died after being tortured in prison. His death was confirmed to Jaish al-Ahrar by HTS on February 22.

 “We demanded that the General Security Service hand over my brother’s body, but they told us that they buried him and gave us the address of the burial place,” Alhakim said, describing it as a large trench where many bodies were buried – a mass grave. “There were many graves without names, only numbered.”



 It was Abdulqadir’s death that sparked the protest movement, which quickly spread to Idlib’s main towns.

 In Binnish the next day, Basha and his fellow activists took their banners and flags and headed to the town centre to join the few dozen people who had gathered.

 Much of the anger was directed towards the HTS leader al-Jolani, with protesters calling for his removal in areas controlled by HTS and its affiliated Salvation Government, and its replacement by an elected body.

 “The era of slavery and tyranny ended with the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011, and the Syrian people, after paying dearly to gain their freedom and dignity, will not allow it to be taken away from them,” Basha said.

 It is a brave stance to take. Idlib province largely remains under the control of Syrian opposition fighters, dominated by HTS after it gradually forced out other opposition factions and monopolised governance of the region.

 HTS – designated a “terrorist” group by the European Union, Turkey and the United States – formed in 2017 as an alliance of several factions opposed to al-Assad in the country’s ongoing war. The principal force in the alliance was Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, formerly an affiliate of al-Qaeda known as the Nusra Front.

 HTS has attempted to rebrand itself over the years, severing ties with al-Qaeda and portraying itself as a more moderate group with local aims, with al-Jolani even going as far as to give an interview to US media outlet PBS.

 It became the most powerful rebel group in northwestern Syria but opposition to its rule is increasing, with activists deeming it vital to break the silence over the group’s violence and grip on security.

 At an event in Idlib city, 30-year-old activist Abdulrahman, who did not wish to give his full name, reiterated the movement’s demands.

 “We want the release of all prisoners of conscience, the disclosure of the fate of those missing in the prisons, and dissolving and restructuring the General Security Service,” he said.

 As an initial response to the protests, HTS held meetings – chaired by al-Jolani – between ministers in the Salvation Government and community elites and village elders who presented the protesters’ demands and received promises to fulfil them.

 “The protests … in the streets against Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham and the Salvation Government are natural and we do not view them in any other context,” said the HTS media office. “We’re confident that those who work make mistakes and all protests aim to correct these mistakes that have recently transpired.”

 HTS said the protesters’ demands were complex and resolving them would require some time. For example, it said, wider participation in the group’s leadership Shura Council would take time to recruit community representatives from different areas.

 Anti-HTS protests have continued in Idlib despite these attempted assurances. However, as of yet, there have been no confirmed reports of protesters being detained by HTS.



 On July 16 of last year, the GSS announced that it had dismantled a spy cell working for Russia, the Syrian government and the US, leading to the arrest of several security personnel and leaders within its ranks, notably Abu Maria al-Qahtani – a Shura Council member considered al-Jolani’s number two.

 He was acquitted and released earlier this month along with other security personnel, although it is unclear whether he continues to hold a leadership role.

 “The popular movement today in Idlib is partly due to internal disagreements within Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham, meaning that conflicting parties within the organisation incite their supporters to participate in these protests,” Wael Alwan, a Syrian affairs specialist at the Jusoor Center for Studies, said.

 “The second part of the movement consists of people who are taking advantage of the opportunity, whether they are social extensions of previous factions that the organisation has targeted, or they are people who have been greatly affected by the General Security Service and the organisation’s security grip,” Alwan said.

 Alwan said that HTS has to placate the popular movement by accommodating its demands as well as making and implementing promises, because putting the protests down by force is not an option, as that would only escalate protests and opposition.

 “Perhaps HTS is betting on reconsolidating itself and regaining its centrality and its ability to solve internal problems, and then it may consider returning to … harsh security,” Alwan said.

 But ultimately, for activists organising against HTS, their protests are a risk. The group is not known for its tolerance towards dissent, and many fear that it will eventually crack down on the demonstrations.

 For Basha, that is still not enough to deter him.

 “Since I joined the first protest against HTS, I knew that I might be arrested or even killed, but when I saw that the number of protesters was increasing with each passing day, nothing frightened me anymore,” he said.

 “My family are the ones who encourage me to always defend the truth and not remain silent against injustice committed by any party – no matter the cost.” '

As the revolution in Syria enters its 14th year, free Syrians are waiting for the spark to reignite

 

 

    Dr Amira Abo el-Fetouh:

 'The Syrian revolution has just entered its fourteenth year. The Arab Spring revolutions swept across the Arab world and broke out in Syria on 15 March, 2011. Had it not been for Russia’s intervention, the Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad would have been overthrown. He preferred Syria to fall into the clutches of the Russian occupation than for himself to join the tyrants Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Egypt, Libya and Yemen respectively.

 Assad was not the only regional dictator fearing for his position; all the Arab kings and princes trembled with him. They all feared that the demand for freedom, dignity and democracy would inspire their own people, and they too would be overthrown. Some of them have now allied themselves with the Zionist enemy. The occupation state of Israel was also disturbed by the revolutions in neighbouring states, whose rulers guarded its borders. That is why the UAE became the epicentre of the counter-revolutions against the Arab Spring. The hope-filled Spring turned into violent autumn, especially in Syria, Libya and Yemen, terrorising protesters and those even thinking about demands for freedom, dignity and democracy.

 Saudi Arabia and the UAE stood against the will of the people and supported the tyrannical rulers, even in Syria, which has witnessed the greatest Arab revolution ever. Never in history has a nation made the sacrifices that the Syrian people have made when everyone teamed up against them. The hyenas of the world mauled Syria’s wounded body, cut off what they could for themselves, and fled with their spoils, leaving Syria drowning in its people’s blood.

 The Syrian revolution was abandoned by those who called themselves “friends of Syria” but instead took their share of the spoils. The Syrians should have stuck by their initial claim: “We have no one but you, O Allah” and not hand themselves over to countries that claimed to support them and supported them with money and weapons until it was clear that they were prisoners of their own fortune and forced to carry out their “friends’” orders. Such countries betrayed Syria and stopped their support, giving priority to regional interests.



 I have said since the beginning of the Arab Spring that the problem of the Arab revolutions was the lack of credible Arab leadership possessing the means and characteristics that would allow it to rally the masses in managing the revolutions, ensuring their success and creating a new, fairer governance system. These revolutions had no legitimate father figure, so everyone claimed that they were that person, leading to damaging infighting.

 The Syrian revolution began in Daraa in south-west Syria, when a number of boys wrote revolutionary slogans, heard when being chanted elsewhere, on the walls of their schools. The Assad régime went crazy; its security forces attacked Daraa and arrested the boys, all of whom were under 13 years old, and tortured them. They were electrocuted and beaten with electric cables; their fingers were cut off, as were their genitals to break their spirit of manhood and strength. The régime forgot that maleness and masculinity are two different things. Fourteen years after being exiled from Daraa, those boys are strong men defending Idlib, the only liberated area of Syrian land, against the oppression of the régime and the Russian occupation.

 When the boys’ families went to the security services to ask about their children, they were insulted, humiliated and thrown out. “Forget about them and have other children,” they were told, “and if you’re unable to, the security will take over the task.”



 The parents were shocked by this response, so they demonstrated against the security forces, and were joined by hundreds of people. Then thousands. The régime responded with live fire, killing dozens. Daraa rose up en masse against the Assad régime, demanding its overthrow. The régime responded to this by besieging the city, but people from neighbouring towns and villages broke the siege.

 Hundreds were arrested, including Hamza Al-Khatib, 13. His body was eventually handed over to his family, and it had clear evidence of torture and the bullets he had been shot with. His neck was broken, and his body was mutilated, with his genitals cut off. Photographs were circulated on the Internet and shocked millions of Syrians. Many took to the streets in massive demonstrations, in solidarity with this child who was betrayed. The demonstrations spread from the capital, Damascus, to Aleppo, Homs, Hama and other Syrian cities. Hamza Al-Khatib became the icon of the Syrian revolution that toppled statues of the murderer Bashar Al-Assad and his father. The people tore up their pictures, trampled on them and burned them.

 The security forces were unable to disperse the demonstrations despite firing volley after volley of bullets at the crowds. That’s when the army went in with its tanks and armoured vehicles. Thousands of martyrs fell. The initially peaceful protests turned into an armed revolution to defend the people of Syria.



 The régime “planted” weapons in front of homes, on the streets, and in cafes to incriminate people, and they released convicted Islamists from prison in order to transform the nature of the revolution. Suddenly, the uprising turned into a “war on terrorism”; those leading the demonstrations were described as “terrorists”; and countries stood in sympathy with the murderous Assad régime.

 Nothing grabs the attention and support of the West than the dog-whistle allegation of “terrorism”. The régime initially sought help from Hezbollah militias and some Shia militias in Iraq and Afghanistan in its war against its own people. When that wasn’t enough, the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, led by Qasem Soleimani, entered Syria and burned and destroyed entire villages, killed thousands of Syrians, and displaced thousands of Sunni Muslims. Soleimani basically turned the revolution into a Sunni-Shia war, but was unable to suppress it. It was the Russian intervention that turned the tide in Assad’s favour, with its aircraft and missiles implementing a scorched earth policy that it had used in Chechnya. The régime used chemical weapons against the Syrian people and dropped barrel bombs on their heads.

 Eventually, the liberated cities began to fall one after another. The régime which had once controlled just 20 per cent of Syria now controlled about 80 per cent. The revolution was confined to Idlib, and revolutionaries from other cities flocked there after international interventions, understandings and agreements between Russia and Turkiye. However, Idlib has not yet been spared from the crimes of Bashar’s militias and the ongoing Russian raids despite such agreements.

 More than two million Syrians have been martyred, and 10 million have been displaced, many from their homeland altogether.

 The Syrian revolution exposed the treachery and betrayal of those closest to it, but the story is not complete; no ending has been written yet. Revolutions, like wars, have many twists and turns until the decisive hour strikes and the curtain falls. Do not be deceived by the butcher Assad remaining president. The flame of the revolution is burning in the conscience of every free Syrian, waiting for the moment for it to reignite on the ground.'

‘Authorities fear us’: Syrian women activists vow to continue revolting no matter the consequences

 ' “We’ve broken the barrier of fear… we’re not afraid anymore,” Syrian women activists say, as they reflect on the past 13 years of ongoing oppression in their homeland.

 Since 15 March 2011, Syrians have been living under the brutal bombardment of the Assad régime, which cracked down on peaceful pro-democracy protestors and continues to threaten those who dare to stand against it.

 The war has resulted in the displacement of over 13 million Syrians, the detention of tens of thousands of civilians, and over 500,000 deaths, the majority of which are at the hands of the Syrian régime and its Russian ally.



 Despite the immense losses suffered, women across the country have courageously assumed the roles of changemakers, advocates and leaders, as they work to rebuild their communities, advocate for peace and demand freedom for their people.

 “A lot of women have assumed positions of responsibility. Today, I don’t just carry the weight of my own responsibilities, I make important decisions and bear their consequences,” Zahra, an activist, teacher and social worker from Raqqa, said.

 During the war, the teacher felt called to create an empowering safe space and support system for women, following traumatic experiences they had endured during the ongoing war.

 So, she co-founded For Feminism, an organisation based in her hometown Raqqa, dedicated to supporting women and enhancing their skills, to enable them to contribute to their communities, “feel their value” and “believe they can make a difference.”

 “We’d hold sessions for women to share and let their feelings out. We aimed to talk about all women’s issues, including laws, our protection, and rights.”



 Zahra faced “difficult decisions” when deciding which responsibilities to assume. ISIS took over her hometown Raqqa from 2013 to 2017, and some women from the city married extremist fighters during the time, “due to difficult life circumstances”, as “many were forced against their will,” Zahra said.

 Upon their release from ISIS-controlled camps – which they left without their missing, or deceased, husbands – Zahra knew that the “vulnerable” women would “no longer be accepted by society.”

 She decided to extend her work to them, by hosting wellbeing sessions for psychological support, despite knowing many within her community would reject such an idea.

 “It was a difficult decision, of course, society didn’t accept ISIS and wouldn’t accept [the women who married them]… but women have been the largest victims of oppression during the war… and desperately need help… including those who made big mistakes,” she said.



 ISIS also banned education during their rule over Raqqa, so on top of the already heavy burden of war, Zahra was challenged with the task of home-schooling her children, which she bore the fruits of years later when her daughter entered medical school.

 Zahra’s commitment to activism and social work – which she also practised by teaching in UNICEF schools post ISIS’ domination of Raqqa – has also been mirrored by women alike across the country.



 “The presence of women in activism is very important. A woman conveys voices. She is a mother, a sister, a wife, the family, she is the society to me,” Lubna, an activist from Suweida, said.

 Lubna is deeply involved in local revolutionary activities, as she works alongside activist groups created for women, such as Sayedat Al-Hirak, and mixed activist groups, including Shabab Soriya Al-Ahrar.

 She, too, emphasised that “women have had a huge part to play in protests and activism”, but highlighted that this has not come without its struggles.

 “The Syrian woman has gone through a lot. She suffered oppression from the régime, and from society. The worst types of torture and insults were thrown on women in prisons,” she said.

 “The régime knows the importance of women’s involvement in the revolution, and as a result, they have tried to silence society through women,” Lubna stated.

 The activist says that the forces have weaponised both societal fears surrounding the protection of women and notions of “shame”, playing on conservative attitudes present in the country, in a bid to stop women from protesting.

 Societal fears come from knowing women could be “vulgarly insulted” or even sexually assaulted in prisons if they were arrested following their activism.

 Such instances could result in the woman affected becoming stigmatised by society, where it is highly probable “people would look at her with pity, or that her life would be considered over”, Lubna said.

 As a result, women have often been advised to, or felt that they should, refrain from participating in the revolution “to avoid bringing harm to themselves, or shame to their family”.



 Destigmatising such cases has also been employed within art activism across the country and among the Syrian diaspora.

 Damascene artist Dima Nashawi, who left Syria to live in Lebanon in 2013, utilised her creative talents to illustrate Syrian struggles, “preserve parts of our narrative, and pursue our dream of changing the country”.

 The artist, who also worked in social care with the UNHCR, has created illustrations calling “for the freedom of detainees, the destigmatisation of female detainees” and has written plays focusing on displacement.

 “It became an urgent need to express my feelings in light of the difficult events in my country… and to stand up to narratives that stereotyped the Syrian revolution,” Dima said.

 “Women were targeted, raped, stigmatised, ostracised, killed… female detainees have been rejected by their circles because of stigmas surrounding honour,” she added.



 The artist highlighted the case of Heba Haj Aref – an activist who was found dead in her home in rural Aleppo last month after receiving threats over her work – as just one example of countless violations against Syrian women who are simply demanding freedom.

 “Authorities are afraid of brave women who confront them… they are afraid of her strength, and her ability to create change, so they threaten her or simply kill her,” she says.

 Dima believes the traumatic experiences endured by Syrian women have “caused a shift, redefined women’s personalities and led many to become inspiring influential voices in defending women’s and human rights” within Syria and across the diaspora.



 Despite the pain and trauma Syrian women have patiently endured, many remain set on continuing their fight for freedom and peace, regardless of the consequences, due to their firm belief that their cause will see victory.

 “People might think we’re seeing dreams, but revolutions have always seen pain… continued fight will be what allows us to win, we will continue peacefully for the sake of our peace,” Lubna said with clear confidence and certainty.

 “The amount of time it takes is not important,” she added, emphasising “our cause is a cause of truth and it’s right”.

 “Those who are righteous may face oppression, being killed, being displaced, they may face a lot of pain, but they are the standing on the right side. They aren’t afraid… and for that, they will be victorious.” '

Thirteen Years Later, Syrian War Still Rages

 

 'For families on the frontline, the end is nowhere in sight.

 "The bombing is always ongoing; every hour, every minute, all the time, " says Khaledia Sakahi, a displaced woman. "If it is not on our village, the bombing will be near it. The villages around us are also being bombed.I can't count them all. But the bombing continues, morning and night, and death, as I told you, many people die."

 In Idlib, emergency workers say the death toll in their region is rising.

 "The statistics for the year 2023 were more than 1230 attacks, with more than 170 killed and 300 injured," says Yassin Khader of the Syrian Civil Defence. "In the last half of 2023, there was an intense and continuous attack on the southern areas."

Commanders of rebels who control Idlib say, they are not just planning to defend the area they currently control. "We did not set out to establish a state in Idlib," says Muhammad al-Bakour, a field commander for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, "and the revolution continues until Assad is held accountable. There is no revolutionary project that stops at Idlib."

 Today, nearly 17 million people in Syria need aid. The most since the war began. Violence, and a lack of basic services like water or electricity, are forcing people to flee their homes again and again.

'As for the rest, such as services, there is nothing available at all," says Khaledia Sakahi. "Everyone is self-reliant. Some people collect firewood, and others do other things, just to survive."

 She says she believes the Syrian war may continue indefinitely, and there is very little hope access to aid will improve.'

 

From Syria to NI: ‘I haven’t seen my son in 13 years... he will be killed if we aren’t reunited’

 

 'Ali’s cat Rocky slinks along the windowsill. Behind him, the window looks out onto a quiet, residential street. Storm Jocelyn’s approach is just starting to move the bushes in the garden.

 He hands me his phone to look at a photograph. A young couple. Three smiling children. The man in the picture is his son Zayan.

 Ali (55) hasn’t seen his son in almost 13 years, and that wait could become interminable soon.

 Both names are pseudonyms, chosen to protect their safety; they are still fearful of reprisals in the Middle East.

  Zayan (29) is facing deportation from Lebanon – where he and his family currently live – back to their native Syria after he was given 28 days’ notice to leave. He has less than three weeks left.

 Thousands of miles away in Northern Ireland, his father is a world away from the horror that began to unfold in his home city of Homs in 2011.



 Inspired by the so-called Arab Spring risings that swept across Middle East, Syrian youths in Daraa scrawled graffiti criticising Bashar al-Assad’s régime on the wall.

 They were arrested, held and tortured, prompting a wave of protest that drew a military backlash.

 "Everything was normal until the revolution started,” Ali said.

 "It was like an earthquake. People got mad, got crazy. I always think that violence affected these people and turned them into monsters, or devils. There was an army checkpoint close to my home. There were clashes and bombing from evening until morning. I moved my family to the town where my wife’s family were, because around my home began to get very dangerous.”

 By 2012, opposition groups had formed rebel brigades to seize cities in the north.

 Lebanon’s Hezbollah would openly deploy fighters in 2013 to supress the uprising, while Iran dispatched military advisors to prop up the al-Assad government.

 As the situation worsened, Ali sent his family to Lebanon, promising he would follow soon, but he would not see his family for another four years.



 Militias surrounded the town and laid siege to it, with only sporadic United Nations aid being allowed in.

 "I never thought I would live the way we lived. Groups of armed people started to defend their families,” said Ali.

 "Every town, guys started to carry guns to defend themselves and their families because they knew that when the régime entered the town, they would rape, steal and kill.

 "People would rather die than face the torturing. You saw pictures of people in prison without eyes, without nails."



 Ali said the cries of hunger from sick, traumatised children continue to haunt him to this day. "We had little food, no medicine. There were 120,000 people in the town. Every few months the UN was entering with some cars of food, but there wasn’t enough,” he said.

 "I did not think I would survive the bombing at night. The shooting, the snipers. The planes. Barrel bombings. For four years, I always felt hungry. I will never forget the weeping of the children and the kids because of the fear and hunger. I still hear them now when I am alone. I can hear their voices and their weeping from the hunger. There are pictures stuck in my mind. A child of six or seven years old licking a photograph of a pizza on a wall. The restaurant was closed, but because of the hunger he was licking this picture. Children were knocking my door and saying they were hungry."



 After four years, the siege was eventually lifted after negotiations between the UN, the al-Assad régime and representatives of the town.

 Ali boarded a UN convoy bound for Idlib, close to the border with Turkey, which he crossed safely two days later. His thoughts turned immediately to his family, but it would be a further three years of agony until he laid eyes on them again.

 Ali struggled to bring his family to Turkey with him, eventually finding some success through the UN and ultimately, the UK Government.

 A third country resettlement was agreed; that country was Northern Ireland. Ali remembers the date clearly.



 "We arrived here on February 7 2019. I left Turkey that morning and my wife and children came after me about two hours later,” he said.

 "I met them at the airport; it was like a dream. When I saw them, I realised then that the most beautiful moments in my life had been lost. I didn’t see my children grow up. My wife was very sick and my other son (Zayan) could not come.”

 That moment is now five years ago.

 Unaware of a new law preventing Syrians from working Lebanon, Zayan was working in a clothing shop, still trying to raise money to support his young family.

 His papers were seized, leaving his future in limbo. The documents were later returned, but along with a 28-day notice to leave Lebanon.



 Ali said the news was akin to a death sentence.

 "I am sure that if the government send them back, the régime will kill them. Most of my family is in opposition [to Assad],” he said.

 "I can’t explain how scared we are. My wife and I are always crying. When anyone from the family sends a message on WhatsApp and it is not received, it is a terrible feeling.

 "We are always worried until he replies on the message. His daughter is seven years old now. When he goes out to buy food she hugs him tight and says: ‘Please father, don’t go anywhere, I am afraid’.



 "Many times I have prayed to God to take me. I can’t stand any more. I just want to see my son and his family in a safe place.” Zayan has completed an initial resettlement interview with the UN, who are aware he has family in the UK.

 Ali is praying he will be called for a second interview before time runs out on his time in Lebanon.

 He wants nothing more than to see the family united in Northern Ireland, somewhere he now calls home.

 "Here, no one calls my son a refugee. Here, they don’t believe we are strangers or unwanted people at all. Here, my family don’t sleep in parks because they haven’t money. Here, my family didn’t go hungry,” he said.

 "Everything I wanted – to see my wife and children happy – is here. The only thing I need now is to see my son before I die, or before my wife dies.'

'We were attacked by missiles, by bombs, simply because we were treating casualties'

 

 ' “Imagine yourself operating on a patient when you are being attacked by barrel bombs and missiles. Your hands are shaking, the hospital is shaking, soil could go in the patient’s wounds while you are operating and then you have to wait a while until the strike stops and carry on.”

 These days, Dr Ayman Alshiekh, 38, is a surgeon in an immaculate, state-of-the-art hospital in Manchester city centre. But only a few years ago, the doctor was facing the unthinkable – trying to save lives in a bloody field hospital in Syria, being hunted by a brutal régime.



 Ayman spent his childhood in his beloved home country of Syria, one of the world’s most ancient centres of culture. Attending primary school, he dreamed of becoming a doctor, understanding from the beginning that he was called to come to the aid of those in need.

 From his primary school days, he excelled in sciences, working hard to get the grades to pursue an education in medicine. Ayman graduated from the University of Aleppo in 2010 and started his training in vascular surgery in Damascus.



 But by 2011, Syria was not a peaceful place to call home anymore. Protests began in March of that year, amid shoots of hope that the country’s authoritarian ruler Bashar al-Assad might be overthrown.

 Ayman was among the young people taking part in what has since become known as the Arab Spring, where protests for a move to democracy spread across the region to the likes of Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. But the dictator responded with a campaign of violence and terror against those pleading for a fairer world.

 In the middle of his third year of training, Ayman was forced to abandon his studies. Ayman suddenly found himself at the heart of a revolution and began work as a war surgeon in a field hospital.

 “Our hospitals were always a magnet for attacks. We were attacked by missiles, by bombs, simply because we were treating casualties,” he said.



 “That was considered a crime by the régime. Due to the siege, no medical supplies could get into Aleppo. We had to make do with what we had. When you are a war surgeon in Aleppo, the most important thing is saving lives. Everything else comes second.”

 Ayman pledged that he would use his medical training to help those being hunted by the Syrian government, who were having to go underground for daring to question the régime. Many of them suffered horrific injuries amid brutal reprisals after protesting the government, leading to the creation of secret, makeshift hospitals.

 Despite his lifesaving work, the régime then turned on Ayman. He says: "I was one of the protesters as well, but I actually didn't expect that the government would start shooting at us, firing directly at our chests, towards us.

 I felt that it was my duty to help these demonstrators because they couldn't go to the government hospitals. They would be arrested - and maybe killed - even in hospital, because the government does not respect a hospital as a special place where people should be treated irrespective of political opinions. In Syria, the government attacked them, killed them, tortured them, arrested them. Many of my colleagues and fellow students started to treat patients in underground hospitals, hidden from the security forces of the Assad régime.

 Because of that, some of my colleagues were arrested. Under torture, unfortunately, they named us. Then I became a wanted person for the régime because I was just treating those demonstrators and protesters. I was doing my job.”

 Ayman often felt helpless as he watched people arrive at hospital, unable to be saved. He could do nothing but stand by as ‘security forces came to the hospital and arrested them while they were bleeding’.

 “We finished one man’s operation, and security forces were standing in front of the theatre room,” said the doctor.

 “When we wanted to take him to the ICU after five hours of operation, they took his trolley and then took him away. Where? We don't know. We needed to help keep them away from the eyes of the security forces because it's our duty to care for our people and our patients irrespective of political opinions. When you save others you don't care about your life sometimes, because it's our duty to rescue all people who need us.”



 Aleppo was known around the world for its beautiful heritage sites, which have been razed to the ground in the turmoil of a devastating civil war of attrition. The years wore on and Ayman found joy in a life cursed by conflict on his doorstep – marriage and a family - but that brought new fears.

 “In the first two or three years of the revolution, I didn’t have a family. I put myself more at risk because I was by myself,” Ayman said.

 “In 2015, I had my son, so then I had responsibilities for my family. I stayed in Aleppo and we were under siege by the Syrian military forces, Russian forces and Iranian forces.

 We stayed under siege for almost six months, with daily bombardment from bombs, air strikes, rockets, and no access to any drugs, medication, food at all.

 After that, we were forcibly displaced out of Aleppo. I went to Idlib, another province in Syria, and I worked there in another hospital for almost an additional year.”

 Around 15 months later, he had a daughter. “I started to feel that I couldn’t sacrifice myself, I had a wife and two kids. The Assad gang, with the help of Russian and Iranian forces, were taking areas and I was scared to be under siege again now that I had a family.”



 The doctor managed to get his family asylum in Turkey – while he stayed behind in Syria continuing to save lives.

 “When the barrel bombs started to fall over us in 2014, I was already working in a field hospital and I couldn't concentrate on treating people because I was always thinking about my family. When I moved them to Turkey, I could at least concentrate on my job,” said Ayman.

 After years on the frontline, Ayman faced his options – stay in Syria and be killed by an airstrike on his hospital, or be killed by the régime for helping the opposition. He was forced to flee and, unable to apply for a visa and wait for the result under the constant threat of death, Ayman attempted the dangerous journey as a refugee across Europe.

 Aiming for the UK as a safe haven, he knew the journey would be treacherous, but there were too many stories of refugees being caught and ‘assassinated’ by Syrian authorities on the continent to stay in mainland Europe. Ayman struggled to speak about this part of his story. It’s just too traumatic, he says.

 He arrived at the end of 2018 ‘in the back of a lorry’ with little money and very few possessions.

 “I faced even more danger than I had in Syria, the journey was difficult. I claimed asylum. Six months later, I was granted refugee status, thankfully,” said Ayman.



 After an incredible, terrifying life in Syria and journey to the UK, in his mid-30s, Ayman settled in Manchester. One day in the future, Ayman hopes to return to his homeland. He said: “I want to help my people there and help rebuild our health system from everything I have learned here.” '

Extracts from Syrian Gulag by Jaber Baker and Ugur Ümit Üngör

 'As a computer geek who had never even been spanked by his parents, or been in a fist fight, Akram was known as a gentle boy who was "homely" (baytuti). The only reason he had been arrested was because he had liked a social media post criticizing the Assad régime. The power cable swooshed through the air, and landed on his skin like a hornet bite. It took his breath away, at first shocked him into an involuntary, bestial scream, followed by the excruciating pain a second later. "You want freedom, right ?!" yelled the torturer sardonically, as he whipped him again, using his full force, "here's your freedom!" Blood flowed down Akram's tender back and legs and dripped on the dirty cement floor. He remained at the Air Force Intelligence branch at Mezze military airport for three months, a stay which change his life forever.'                                                                                                                              [p1]

 'Former detainees such as him suffer from a certain speechlessness, as the violence they suffered was literally unspeakable and they remain at a loss for words.'
[p31]

 'Inserting solid tools in the anus. Touching women's genitals. Complete stripping during inspection, interrogation, or torture. Tying the penis to prevent a detainee from peeing. These were methods of torture observed in the Palestine branch.'
[p46]



 ‘The year 1983, saw the start of a more relaxed treatment. It was – as we later found out – a plan to extort money from the prisoners’ families. An impromptu mini-market was opened in the prison selling tea, some vegetables and stolen clothes. During their visits, parents brought money and other items to their sons. The Prison Director confiscated 90% of them, and put them in the mini market for Abu Awad to sell to prisoners at exorbitant prices. Money was manipulated out of the prisoners by all means, but at least people experienced a level of comfort.

Some of the beatings and torture were lifted. We were also able to raise our heads and open our eyes during “breathing” and in front of the police. You were able to laugh if we couldn’t hold it, which was forbidden before.

The friction happened between the pillars of the régime. This resulted in the overthrow of the prison administration, which was replaced by a new administration eagerly seeking revenge. They became more creative in modes of torment than before. The frequent beatings, the lack of food, the abundance of everything that disturbed daily life were back.’
[p199]

 ‘Treatment in Saydnaya was unfair and devoid of any constraints. Torture came from a justifying mentality by Military Police, on the basis they were dealing with “traitors”. From the onset they ask about the level of education among detainees; those educated received more intense torture. I told them I was a tailor to protect myself from the increased dose of torture, as happened with doctors, engineers, and other academics.’
[p214]

 ‘The detainees imprisoned on charges of Communism were moved to the second floor after a message they were trying to smuggle out was caught. It described the policemen as “bats of darkness” and us, the Islamists, as “comrades of the struggle”.’
[p218]

 ‘There was now a prison emir from the al-Qaeda group running his group’s affairs. A more militant current of al-Qaeda was born in prison, whose members later joined the Islamic State. It was this group that took control of the ground floor of the prison in the final confrontation. That group considered everyone infidels, even Salafi-jihadists and Al-Qaeda. The third group of the prisoners were the open-minded Salafists. They too had different factions that considered the others as infidels. The fourth group of the prisoners were the rest of the detainees, held on democratic backgrounds, or under espionage or political charges.’
[p232]

 ‘ “Seven or eight soldiers would enter the dormitory and take us one by one to the wheel.” These rounds of torture killed at least one or two detainees on every wing. “The death of any of us did not inflict sadness or grief. Our death was a joy of salvation for us, and at the same time our colleagues were happy to share our food. Saydnaya killed humanity within us and turned us into a different type of human beings.” ‘
[p245]

 ‘Some had nothing to do with the revolution but were kidnapped for ransom money, or were taken hostage in place of their relatives fighting in the Free Syrian Army. Some were forced to record televised testimonies confirming the régime’s version that the revolution was an armed act of Islamic extremists. After that they negotiated with their families for their release in exchange for large sums of money.’
[p292]

 ‘The Mukhabarat have been extorting Syrian society for decades, for example in setting up checkpoints or soliciting bribes for various economic activities. This extractive and parasitic attitude toward Syrian society manifests itself especially in the Gulag. As the father of one Syrian detainee said: “Detention is expensive. If you have a detainee [in your family] it means the same officers who are responsible for your pain enjoy your money.” ‘
[p315]

Crimes, Occupation, Fragmentation and Impunity: 12 Years of the Struggle for Syria Part 3

Ziad Majed: 

 ‘…a crime that will last long, meaning you will keep thinking of it. It will go with you, not like rape, there’s nothing like rape, but it’s in a way; instrumentalising the rape as well, is to target the person, but also the whole social environment, and the whole society, with crimes that we go with you, as the régime says, forever. Marking the bodies of the people, through torture, through hunger, through rape; so that the crime will live with those that survived, and with their families, as long as possible. That is a policy, it’s not just violent thugs who go and torture and kill.

 So this was also one of what we learned from the Syrian war, and finally, conspiracy theories. Since September 11th, anything that happens, you might have conspiracy theory about it. Who’s behind it, who’s responsible, who benefits from this, etc. And with the age of social media, you do have on Syria lots of conspiracy theories. Who is behind what happened; is a matter of pipeline that should have passed by Syria, that’s why Westerners created the war; Assad is a resistance against Israel and imperialists, so the imperialists created all that.

 And you have unfortunately, on the left part of the political maps, in many European countries, but also the region, and in Turkey, in many places: those who believe of a plot against Assad because his resistance, because he’s anti-imperialist; and they supported him for that. And that was horrible, because as if they contributed to a racist approach, when it comes to thinking of Syrians as people manipulated by remote control, by invisibilising them, by bringing them out of the picture, and just talking about few geostrategic concerns, that anyone can talk about, without knowing anything about the region.

 Plus, there was also in some places, this attempt at telling the Syrians what is better for them. I’ll give you the advice, because I’m wise. I will tell you what you should do and should not do, and we have seen it a lot, and this is unfortunately related, not only to the Middle East, I think the approach towards some African countries could also be the same, in Asia as well. Even in our societies here, the class issue might lead to something similar; but Syria showed us to which extent we can invisibilise people, we can dehumanise them, and just talk about some borders in our café, giving the impression that we know much more than they do, because we are progressive, so they should listen to us, and forget about their dignities and rights.

 When I said it’s documented, we know who killed whom in Syria. It’s not true that no one knows who killed whom, as some people started to say. Regions and neighbourhoods who are bombed, we know who bombed them, because everything is filmed, because military operations are documented, because flights are documented.



 And you can see that 87% of the civilian victims of the conflict, who are documented - because this is also another thing, always figures can be questioned, right, but usually in conflicts that last more than a year, two three, four, we’re talking about ten years, you have many other victims that are not in the statistics, because they die for other reasons. When you are displaced, you might die in an accident, in an area that you don’t know quite well. When all hospitals are saturated, many people with chronic disease, or with other problems, might not have health care, and will die. In these kind of contexts, cancers and heart attacks, are much higher than in normal contexts. So the figures might be much more important when it comes to the civilian losses, and we’re not talking about military losses, that might bring the figure up to more than half a million.

 So 87% were killed by the Syrian régime. 3% by the Russian forces, making that 90%. 2.19% by ISIS, 1.83% by the opposition, 1.32% by the Americans and the US-led coalition, 0.62% by the Kurdish militias, and 0.23% by al-Qaeda or al-Nusra, and you have 3.65% by unidentified. This is one indicator about criminality, but not only, it’s also about the firepower, or about the intensity of the bombing that we saw in Syria. And those figures here, when I said we know the names and IDs of the people, it’s not just estimations.

 When it comes to those who were forcibly disappeared, we have 120,000 until today. 85% disappeared in the régime, 7.71% in the ISIS or Daesh, the rest in the jails of the other groups.



 So, the question of impunity, and I conclude with this. There are a few developments recently, which might be interesting developments. They are not sufficient, but something is maybe changing. In Germany, you have many cases, due to the fact that some of the perpetrators, or some of the criminals, live in Germany. And some of their victims live in Germany. There were many cases brought to court, and many decisions that were taken by the German justice, that are encouraging in the struggle, or in the fight, against impunity.

 You also have the Netherlands and Canada, that did send, in fact, a case to the ICJ – International Court of Justice – when it comes to crimes against humanity committed by the régime. They talk about torture and rape specifically, and that is important, and the ICJ accepted the case, and it will continue working on it, so that is also another sign of hope.

 Now France did issue an arrest warrant, to three generals of the régime; Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and I forget the name of the third. Who are responsible for the death of two Syrian-French citizens. The father Mazzen Dabbagh, and his son Patrick. They have the French nationality, and their brother lives in France, so he brought the cause to court, and there were investigations about the place where they were arrested, where they died. Their families were just sent certificates of the death, without the bodies of course. But there is a clear case, leading to those arrest warrants.

 And more important, two weeks ago, an arrest warrant against Bashar al-Assad himself, his brother Maher, and two other persons working for him who were in charge of the chemical programme. Why? Because this is a crime against humanity, with the chemical programme, and there were enough documentation, by Syrians who are in France now, and by relatives of victims who are in France now, allowing the French justice to start working on the case.

 So these are some examples. There are others that will follow in Sweden, in Belgium, in other places. There were attempts also here in England. There was the case of the American journalist Colvin, who was killed in Homs, in the US. Even the officer who gave the order of bombing her was revealed. And what happened to him, after his name was revealed in the court in America? He was killed in Syria, by the régime, by some people who eliminated him in Deir Ezzor. Exactly as most of those who were involved probably with the assassination of Hariri, or at least their names were known as possible people who have liaison with that, were also killed; Kanaan, and then Rustom Ghazali, generals of the Syrian army.

 So this is an indicator as well that the Syrian régime takes into consideration, that maybe something might move when it comes to the justice. Even if so far, impunity gave this régime, and many other Arab régimes, but also the Israeli state, lots of arrogance. And when you have impunity, why not commit more crimes to protect yourself, to “defend” yourself, or to impose yourself?

 But maybe if something starts to change, and if the régime is a bit alarmed by it, it means it is a bit serious. So hopefully, this sign of hope, with the other sign of hope, which is the work of the Syrian diaspora, on cultural questions, on documentation, on legal issues, on preserving the memory, and preserving the names and the hopes of the people who fought for twelve years in Syria; maybe this would be a note of hope with which I will finish my presentation, and I thank you for your patience.’

Crimes, Occupation, Fragmentation and Impunity: 12 Years of the Struggle for Syria Part 2

 Ziad Majed: 

 ‘… in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, where Daesh imposed itself.

 Now, regardless of all that, the social basis of the régime, and the demography supporting the régime, was becoming more and more tired with the war. By 2015, with all those complications, and lack of international political investment in Syria, lack of initiatives - there was a UN initiative in Geneva bringing some representatives of the régime, and different opposition groups to talk about a possible constitution, reconciliation, ending the conflict – all of that is agonising in fact, not progressing.

 But on the ground, the régime is losing control over more and more territory. By summer 2015, the régime controlled only between 18 and 20% of Syria. Mainly Damascus, the area around Damascus, and all the areas close to the Lebanese borders, plus the Mediterranean coast, where is the majority of the Alawite community, that Assad was trying to mobilize as much as possible, and connecting his own destiny to the destiny of the whole community. And when it comes to the Lebanese borders, that was strategic for the Iranians and to Hezbollah, not to lose that area, because this is the connection between Syria and Lebanon, for the weapons, for strategic consideration; and they kept as well a kind of corridor, connecting that area to Iraq. Because if you look at the map, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, they needed a territorial continuity. That’s why Hezbollah’s efforts were mostly around Damascus, and around the Lebanese border.

 But that was not enough any more. So the Iranians did negotiate, as of March 2015 until June 2015, with the Russians. On a possible Russian intervention, to save a régime, that the Iranians said we cannot continue any more. Because, at the time, Iran brought not only Hezbollah, that was securing the part in Syria that was close to the Lebanese borders, but they brought as well Iraqi militias, they then brought Hazara from Afghanistan and refugees in Iran militia, then there would be Pakistani militia Zainebiyoun; they brought them, and they were supporting Assad. Plus there was a kind of decentralisation of the security machine of the régime, by allowing local militias, pro- régime, in the Alawite areas, in some of the Christian areas, and in many other places, to emerge, and to control the ground, so the army of the régime that is losing men, and cannot recruit any more, could be on the fronts with the militias that Iran brought.

 And this is what would lead finally, in September, to Russian intervention in Syria. Russian intervention, that in a way, would show that, overthrowing Assad is not possible any more. It became an illusion to consider, after the Russian intervention, that militarily on the ground, we can overthrow Assad.

 And gradually, in fact, the Russian intervention will allow Assad to start seizing the territories that his régime lost during the four previous years. Moving from around 20%, to what is today between 60 and 62 or 63% of the territory of Syria, with all major cities under his control. And that was one objective, to have urban Syria under the control of the régime, and to keep a divided, fragmented, rural Syria outside the control of the régime, if he can not seize it back.

 So the war that Russia will lead, two years later will see its impact, after seizing back eastern Aleppo, after taking over the Ghouta and Daraa, ending with Homs before and then with northern Hama, pushing away any threat on the city, plus Deir Ezzor. So the régime will connect most of its cities, except for Idlib and Raqqa, as important cities, will control them.

 And in between, due to the fact that the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans were fighting Daesh on the ground, there would be an expansion of the Kurdish territorial control, that pushed Turkey to intervene directly, after being indirectly behind some of the opposition groups.

 So by 2018, and after the two summers of 2017/18, by March 2019, because this is when Trump declared the war on Daesh as mission accomplished; since that time, we have a kind of statico. It’s not always 100% the same map, sometimes there are a few clashes here and there, that might change part of the control in this territory or the other; but in general, the map is the same since 2018. The régime controls 60% now of the territory, the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans control around 20-25%, and then you have 10-12% in two different enclaves controlled by the oppositions. One of them directly supported by Turkey, the other by the Americans in the south. And you have the Russian army, the Iranian forces and the series of militias they brought, you have the American army, the Turkish army, and you have regularly Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah bases and on Iranian convoys in Syria. So, a country with different occupation forces.



 So, this is the map now of the control. You can see it in red you have the régime, the Russians, the Iranians and their allies. In green you have the oppositions. When I say the oppositions, it’s rival groups, they’re not like a unified camp. So you have here in the Tanf area military bases, some refugees living down there, and supported by the Americans. In that area, some forces of the opposition were trained exclusively or only to fight ISIS, when ISIS existed, and they refused. They said we want to fight the régime and ISIS, so their mission was put on hold. And since that time, they have been in those bases. Sometimes they are attacked by Iranian drones, sometimes nothing happens and the Americans retaliate and bomb Iranian militias, but this is an area controlled by the opposition.

 And that area in the north, where you have as well al-Nusra or Tahrir al-Sham, former al-Qaeda, in Idlib; and different groups of oppositions in the other part, directly supported by Turkey. In this area, you have the Turkish army present as well.

 What is in yellow is the Kurdish controlled territory, with American bases, and a few special forces from France and Britain. And you have as well camps in this area, of the families of former Daesh fighters who were killed or captured by the Kurdish militias or by the Western allies. That is a big issue, whether they should return or not return. I think in different European countries, the debate exists, and each country adopted a different approach to it.



 So, a fragmented country, an occupied country, and at the same time the destructions in Syria – that’s why I said at the beginning it’s a laboratory, maybe now in Gaza the destructions are more important too, the intensity of the bombing is much higher, and the space is much smaller - but what they call in French urbicide, you can say it; this urbicide, whether in Aleppo, whether in Homs, whether in some other places, the amount of destruction you see, was clearly also on purpose. To displace people, to make it impossible for them to return, because the question of the refugees, and the question of the displacement, was the policy, was the demographic policy based on sectarian or confessional lines.

 And Assad did not hide it in two occasions when he mentioned that the Syrian social fabric or social tissue is much better now, when he said that those who left, he did not say they could not return, but he said that the country is much better now, and is more homogenous after their departure. Plus he refused their return during the process of normalisation with Saudi Arabia recently. After the normalisation with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The three also who normalised at the same time with Israel their relations.

 Now, what I said at the beginning about this laboratory, in addition to the map and the layers that we saw, with a conflict that had many wars at the same time. There is a kind of Kurdish/ Arab tribes war in the east, there are wars between many opposition groups, there are rival groups loyal to the régime, there is a war between the régime and the oppositions, there is a war between Russia and Iran on the one hand opposing them to the opposition, there were clashes between Turkey and Russia and then they reconciled, there are clashes between Turkey and Kurds that are negotiated regularly by the Americans and the Russians in order to contain them, Israel bombs Hezbollah and sometimes Hezbollah retaliates.



 So you have different conflicts taking place at the same time, and the national cause of the Syrians in that sense, got lost. It did not disappear, it did not vanish, but it was lost in between all those ongoing conflicts and struggles on the Syrian land. It became an incarnation of the UN inability to deal with the situation, 14 vetoes. Sometimes, some diplomats say the vetoes were not that bad, because if there was no veto, we need to be able to impose what the UN resolution might stipulate. So, in some cases, it was not like a terrible arrangement, even for Western powers who were protesting against the Russian use of veto.

 So, the inability of dealing with the conflict, and the fact that it kept evolving one year after the other, created questions and problems that we will live with for a long period of time. Definitely we cannot explain the Russian war in Ukraine based on the Syrian model. For sure, there are historical contexts and reasons for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But if Russia was not allowed to intervene the way it did in Syria, I’m not sure the same configuration in the invasion of Ukraine that happened; Syria allowed Russia to feel much more confident in its aggressive policy, and made its invasion of Ukraine, I think, more possible.

 The other thing, is that the refugee crisis, did lead in some places to hysteria. Not only in Europe, by the way, in Lebanon also, in Turkey in the last few years also. But parts of the reasons for this hysterical rise of the far right in many places, is related to migration and refugees, and for sure the Syrian crisis and the millions of Syrian refugees, in a way were part of the reason of that. Which means leaving the country, abandoning the country, and allowing a régime and some forces to displace people the way this happened, without any intervention, also had consequences elsewhere. In Europe, around the Mediterranean, and in the neighbouring countries where racism, crisis, instrumentalisation of the misery of the refugees, are now parts, characteristics, of the domestic political scenes.



 And, of course, Syria is given as an example now in the Arab world. Whoever speaks again about revolution, revolutionary attempts, revolutionary aspirations, democratic transition; ah, you want to become like Syria. Exactly as a few years before, they use to say, ah, you want to become like Iraq. Or like Libya at the beginning of the revolutions. So Syria became a kind of a model. A kind of example given, always, you want Syria, or stability, even if under a dictator. You want Syria, and becoming a refugee, or you accept a Sisi or a Saied or many examples can be given.

 And of course, Gulf countries used that example on many occasions as well, promoting what they call stability, rather than what revolutions create in terms of instability. So the counter-revolutionary model took Syria as an example, and built on it to end any democratic aspiration; even if that did not really work well, because remember 2019 Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria, the second wave of Arab revolutions. But once again, they were defeated, like most of the previous ones. They were defeated, but it showed that the story is not over in a way. That there are still dynamics, and there are still factors that might bring people again to the streets; even if two defeats, and the second defeat immediately after it, Covid, and all the crisis that followed, and then the collapse of the Lebanese economy, and the civil war in Sudan.

 It’s not encouraging any more, but for now we can see that revolutionary model was defeated, but maybe it’s not like a final defeat, or a definite defeat.

 Syria became a laboratory of violence. I think this is the most documented conflict in history. We’ve seen almost everything. Sometimes the criminals themselves filmed what they did. We don’t know if they did it in order to frighten the others, in order to be proud about what they did. I think you also recently in the Guardian the films that were brought from Tadamon massacre, where they are laughing, while asking people to run and then shooting them, and then burning them. There are tens of videos, if not hundreds of videos like that, filmed by the killers, the perpetrators, themselves.

 Plus you have lots of statistics, about all airstrikes. There are lots of satellites as well, filming all the time, showing all the time. There were some alerts about a possible airstrike would take place here, take place there. So it is extremely well documented. And that might be a basis, not only for a historical archive, but also a good basis for later judicial procedures, maybe some investigations.



 This is the most documented conflict, and the philosophy of violence of the régime is not like just it’s war and everything is allowed. No. There were clear messages through the violence. For instance, not giving the families the bodies of their beloved ones who were killed under torture, or were just killed and their bodies were taken, is not something because of lack of administrative capacities. No. It is not allowing them to turn pages, to consider that they can go on. It is to keep them suspended in time, always waiting, always paralysed. It’s a way of paralysing a whole society, and that’s why there are still more than 100,000 people in jail in Syria under the régime control. Why wouldn’t they release them, they’re not any more a threat? The régime is not threatened any more, with the Russians. To keep them is also to paralyse millions of people: relatives, friends, families; who don’t want to talk about them.

 There’s an economy that has been built, a mafia economy. I pay people money to get some information. And in many cases, the information is wrong, they are just lies, they are taking the money. Or I pay someone money, so they will treat my brother or my father or my son a bit better. They will give him some better food. They send food sometimes, and many people are still in Damascus. They don’t want to leave, because they hope that one day, maybe he is alive, maybe she is alive.

 So that kind of paralysing a society is not just arbitrary violence, it’s a well-thought and planned violence. Exactly as the destruction of all suburbs of cities, with the idea of one day reconstructing these areas with a different economic model, for other social classes, and maybe for people from other communities as well, in a sectarian system, and sectarian régime approach.

 The other issue, is allowing people to steal, what the Syrians call taafish, from afish, which means the furniture, meaning seizing the furniture. Taking what is so intimate. The idea of not only destroying the public space where you can live, but I will also destroy your private place. I will seize all your memories, all whatever you lived with, the furniture, your pictures; and I will sell them at markets, that were called the Sunni market, souk Sunna, in order to create more sectarian anger and hatred, and to divide the society even more. So this is also a well-thought policy.



 The question of imposing sieges. I don’t know if you saw pictures from the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, or from the Ghouta of Damascus, or from many other places. Besieging people, without a military in fact need, because the balance of power is so clear. And they have the air force, and they have the Russians. But it is also, to keep in their mind forever, that they suffered hunger, that they were suffocating under the siege, that the régime can do whatever it wanted to do with them, that their lives were just the matter of a decision.’

Crimes, Occupation, Fragmentation and Impunity: 12 Years of the Struggle for Syria Part 1

 Ziad Majed:

 ‘…And the borders might be more important than the political sociology. Also see the conspiracy theories, we’ve seen it more than in other cases, maybe because of its geography, or political geography. It reflected lots of divisions, not only in Syria, or the region, but internationally as well, in the two sides of the political map, whether on the right, or on the left.

 After 12 years we can start examining some dynamics, that happened through the development of the conflict; or of the revolution at the beginning, then the war, then the series of military interventions. As you will see, the end result is today, a fragmented country, a destroyed country. We have records in terms of victims, in terms of internally displaced population, but also in terms of refugees.



 When we were discussing the topic, I thought of impunity, because I think impunity has been, and continues to be, one of the most important and dangerous questions; in the whole Middle East, maybe also an international question.

 But in the Middle East specifically, you do have a number of UN resolutions, a number of agreements, you have many things that were never respected, and none of those who did not respect them ever paid the price of that. So, this culture of impunity also allows criminality to develop, because those that commit crimes consider that they can always escape, after a period of time. Because they are protected by some superpower, because there are members in the Security Council backing them.

 And the Middle East is the area where you have the highest number of vetoes. The United States used the veto 54 times, in relation to the Israeli question. Russia used it, in those 12 years, 14 times. China used it 13 times. So you have a concentration of what we call vetocracy in international relations, where we can sometimes not impose things, but we can definitely make things impossible or to happen; which allows impunity to continue to impose itself, and to modify lives of people and societies, and to contribute in a way to what we might call nihilism: this rejection, this anger, this frustration, against the whole world, since the whole world abandoned us, or is not seeing us as equals, or as if we are excluded from the international community, and international law was not designed to include us, to protect us, as it should protect other peoples.



 So, what I will try to do, is first of all go through the phases of this Syrian struggle, of the Syrian revolution and war. What changed in six summers. It happened that these developments always took place in summers, and we’ll see how each summer, the configuration, the physiognomy of the conflict, was changing, and evolving, and other actors were projecting themselves into the Syrian scene. Then I’ll talk about some of what Syria revealed to us throughout the years.



 So, for the chronology of events, in March 2011, many revolutions were already taking place. The whole movement started in Tunisia, then we had Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain. Then Syria surprised most people, because no one was expecting, in a country where you already have a régime that is not into just symbolic violence after imposing itself for years, or just using the police as in the case of Tunisia to control the society, or the army in the case of Egypt; leaving also some margin of freedom for some parties as long as they do not threaten the régime itself and the military; or as in Yemen due to the tribal structure, the political structure, some parties in the north or south.There were some spaces in which political activism can express itself , and then it threatens the existing régime, then there will definitely be violent repression.

 In the case of Syria, we were already into permanent violence, a State of violence. This happened in the 70s. It happened in Hama in ’82, and it was kind of a lesson for the Syrian people, in the sense that what you will expect if you think of rebelling against the régime, if you think of challenging, of defying the régime, is what happened to Hama, and what will happen to you.

 Hama ’82 is a trauma in Syria, because that city, in three weeks, was massacred, bombed. Thousands of people died, thousands disappeared, and maybe the Syrians thought in 2011, that this was possible, because no one documented what happened. Because no one covered what happened. There were no images. Victims were invisible. This whole orchestrated crime against the city happened without witnesses.

 So, maybe in 2011, because of the mobile phones, because of the daily coverage, because of videos, because of documentation, because of media; the world will not allow Hama to be reproduced, once, twice, three times, four times, as things will happen later.

 So Hama was a trauma, and many people after Hama thought it would take a long, long time before the Syrian people will try to challenge the régime again. And before Hama there was Palmyra or Tadmor, the famous prison in Syria, where torture was an industry, and where also hundreds of people died under torture.



 You have many events in Syria’s modern history under Assad’s father from 1970-2000, then Assad Jr from 2000 until today in 2023, so we’re talking about 53 years of the Assads, and in 2011 it was already 41 years of the Assads. It was a surprise for many observers, to see demonstrations are taking place, but in this kind of situation, and with the régime that already saw what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, immediately the brutal violent repression will start, and will target demonstrators, and soon the country will go into an armed struggle, where either soldiers from the army left the troops, or young men took the weapons to defend themselves, to protect demonstrations.

 So an armed struggle went in parallel with the demonstrations until 2012. So the first shift, or the first change, was the militarization of the revolution, as of August 2011, after a series of defections in the army, leading to the creation in June 2011, of the Free Syrian Army.

 The second crucial development was in 2012. In the summer as well, when the Assad régime used for the first time its air force, bombing the areas that went out of its control; used the ballistic missiles, Scud missiles, sending them from southern Syria to the north.

 And also in 2012, we have the Iranian involvement, in support of the régime, that became clear. It was in the beginning, maybe the first year, technical advisers, political advisers. Now we have more and more Iranian officers in Syria. And in that same summer of 2012, the first funeral of a Hezbollah fighter happened in Lebanon, showing that Hezbollah is involved, based on Iranian demands, in the Syrian war, that is now more and more a war.

 This is an intervention that is clear now, the Iranian and the allies of Iran, but this is also the summer when the first elements of what we can call jihadism appear in Syria.

 Let me just in a few words, distinguish between what we will call, and we will use that term later, jihadism, and what is kind of classical political Islam that already existed in Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood are a powerful group in Syria. Some other salafi groups also were present. What I mean by jihadists are not only those who are not Syrians, or coming from outside Syria, either from Iraq, or through the Turkish borders coming from Europe or sometimes from North Africa or from other places, with this idea of a jihad in Syria. What we mean by that is that they are not usually concerned with the territoriality of the conflict, or the political temporality of the conflict. They go wherever the conditions of jihad, according to the fatwa they receive, wherever those conditions are gathered, or they can prove them or find them or justify them. So they considered Syria a land of jihad, after considering Iraq a land of jihad, after being, or some of them at least or a previous generation, considering Afghanistan a land of jihad. Then Libya became a land of jihad, then Mali.

 So they are not into the territoriality, or the temporality, of the political cause. They started arriving in Syria, proclaiming that they are going to build an Islamic motherland, they would fight the enemies of Islam in Syria; and the early elements, or let’s say those that arrived first in 2012, either came from Iraq, where they were already fighting the Americans, and the pro-American and pro-Iranian government in Baghdad, or probably the Turkish services allowed them to enter Syria, because they thought they can instrumentalise them against the Kurds. You know, that Turkey immediately after the revolution, had the Turkish obsession, if we can put it like that, with the Kurdish issue. So, to keep an eye on the Kurds, and to have a powerful group that might fight them if they will expand in their territorial control.



 So there are a series of events in 2012, which will definitely modify the whole situation. And in summer 2013, a turning point with the chemical weapons. After a very sad statement made by Obama. Until now, no one knows if he was advised, and he said it after getting the advice of people around him, or it was just a statement made following a question by a journalist, “What is the red line in Syria?” That was the question. We have already thousands of people killed, tens of thousands wounded, many who disappeared, already stories about torture in jail are everywhere, rape is being used as a political instrument, we have displacement, refugees are arriving in Turkey and Jordan and in Lebanon, the neighbouring countries; and Obama was asked, what is the red line?



 He said the only red line is chemical weapons. Meaning the régime should not use the chemical weapons. Now, of course, we can interpret later you it was understood by Assad; as long as you say there is only one red line, that is chemical weapons, it means we can keep killing people without chemical weapons. Except that, and this is related to impunity, Assad wanted to show, to the Syrians, his social bases or those who support him, and those who are opposed to him, that even that red line, he can cross it, and nothing will happen.

 And though he was advised on that by Russians, there are already some debates about whether the Iranians wanted it or not, whether the Russians said we will test the American will, especially that Obama at the same time was negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. And people around him were saying, we can’t negotiate with Iran, and then fight them in Syria. Others would add to this, that after the Libyan disaster as it was called in the American administration, following the UN resolution and the intervention against Gadaffi, the Americans didn’t want to intervene again in the region. He was promising he would withdraw from Iraq, and he withdrew in 2011 massively from Iraq. The American public opinion was opposed to any involvement.

 We can talk about lots of considerations and factors, parameters that are legitimate, they can be discussed. But that statement, about the red lines, was very strange in its timing. And Assad tested it.

 First in Jobar, which is a neighbourhood very close to Damascus, where it was used against fighters the first time. A French journalist brought samples from the hair and from the sand to prove it, that was what the laboratories wanted. And there was proof that sarin gas was used for the first time.



 Before, they used a few substances in Homs, where the Red Cross said that some of the people who were burned, they couldn’t deal with their injuries. Was it chemical or not chemical? There was a debate about it. But in May 2013, clearly it was used in small doses in Jobar; before the 21st of August when the massive attack with sarin gas targeted the two Ghouta of Damascus, the two large neighbourhoods not far from the capital, where more than 1400 people died in a few hours during that attack.

 So here it was clear that the red line was crossed on purpose, to test the US will or the Western will, during a moment of tension with Russia. Russia is supporting the régime, for different reasons, but is not yet involved directly.



 And what happened after it, the red line was crossed? Nothing, in fact, once again. There will be a statement by Kerry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he said, following a meeting with Lavrov, that if the Syrian régime accepts to destroy, or to abandon its stock of chemical weapons to give it to a UN inspection mission, we’re fine with that. So it appeared as if once again, if I kill someone, and then I give you the gun, I’m fine.

 These kind of messages are extremely dangerous when it comes to impunity, because the régime and the Russians understood through that offer, that there is no will in the US to go into an intervention against Assad, following the crossing the red line. They knew they cannot go to the UN of course, there would be a Russian veto. But in the American constitution, the President, as long as the military operation would not require deployment on the ground, as long as it is less than 60 (I think) days; the President can order a military operation, which did not happen.

 In Britain, also, they voted in the Parliament, against it. In France, they were very hesitant about it. And then finally, the agreement was a UN resolution, that will impose on the régime, to abandon its chemical programme, and the stocks should be gathered by the UN inspection mission; and negotiations started about that. But the régime did prove, to its social bases, as well as to the Syrians and to those who are fighting him, I can even use chemical weapons, I can even cross the only red line that is set, and nothing will happen.



 And that was a game-changer in the case of Syria, because it’s not a coincidence that following August 2013, Daesh (or ISIS) will start its rise. At the time, we are still in a moment where al-Qaeda in Iraq is itself in Syria. Nusra is part of it, but not very happy with it, so you have within the jihadist map rivalries and different interpretations of who should take the lead, and Baghdadi is still in Iraq. And after 2013, with a certain consensus maybe among the Syrians, that no one is going to intervene to save them from Assad; this is the beginning of the rise of the two nihilist groups, of the two jihadist groups, Nusra and ISIS. ISIS is not always the exact translation, because it’s the Levant or al-Sham at the end.

 But this is a crucial moment in that sense, and this is also the beginning of the massive departure from Syria. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians reached Turkey and Jordan and Lebanon, because once again, they felt totally abandoned and vulnerable and no one is going to intervene, whatever would happen, and whatever kind of weapons would be used against them.



 And this is the fourth summer the summer of 2014. Baghdadi declares officially that he is now the Caliphate, and the Caliph, and the Caliphate is there, between parts of Iraq and Syria. He’s fighting mainly other jihadists, but also Islamist Syrian groups, because the extension of ISIS throughout the Syrian territory did not clash with the Syrian régime. They took over Deir Ezzor, then they took over Raqqa, all of the east of Syria that was already under the control of the Syrian opposition. So the expansion of Daesh weakened and fragilised the Syrian opposition, before clashing with the régime. And definitely the régime and the Iranians who were setting the strategy, were not unhappy with it. Because now the formula, and the equation, that Assad kept using in its propaganda, that against me we only have jihadists, we only have al-Qaeda, we only have Islamists who want to overthrow a secular progressive régime; all of that now, for Assad it’s a kind of prophecy that its propaganda used, and now he’s not far from realizing it, and talking more and more about it, which again is something that will change lots of approaches towards the Syrian situation.

 US intervention against ISIS, exclusively against ISIS, started following that rise, because they killed American, and I think a British as well, humanitarian aid workers in Syria. So Obama declared war on ISIS. And this is the beginning of the US intervention.’